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Abstract 
This is a study of the impact of the specific sets of HRM practice on organisational 
performance within an emerging market setting. It seeks to explore which HR practices are 
most closely associated with better organisational performance within the financial services 
industry in Jordan based on a survey of managers and objective companies data, and the 
broader implications thereof. It also sheds new light on the relative reliability of management 
perceptions of organisational performance when compared with more objective measures. It 
was found that the only HR practice seen to consistently impact both objective and subjective 
performance was the relative emphasis placed on training: the latter is an ambiguous 
measure, and, inter alia, can reflect a long-term commitment by a firm to its people, or 
considerable attention being dedicated to the induction and orientation of new staff in 
response to high staff turnover rates. Although belied by objective firm performance data, 
many respondents believed that the extensive usage of extrinsic incentives (pay and 
promotion) was bound to translate into superior results. This highlights both the limitations of 
relying on managerial reported performance data in exploring the consequences of specific 
HR practices, and the limited transferability of perceived best practice models within 
emerging market settings.  
Keywords: HR practices, perceived and actual performance, emerging markets, exploratory 
and confirmatory factor analysis, convergent and discriminant validity, hierarchical 
regressions. 
 
Introduction 
This is a study of the impact of specific sets of HRM practice on organisational performance 
(OP) within an emerging market setting. Although much of the HRM literature holds that 
effective people management represents a durable source of competitive advantage (Pfeffer, 
1994, 1998; Schuler & Jackson, 1999; Khandekar & Sharma, 2005; Darwish and Singh, 
2013), somewhat less clear is which of the specific HR practices are most likely to enhance 
performance (Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Wright & Gardner, 2003; 
Paauwe, 2009; Guest, 1997, 2011; Singh et al., 2012), and how performance may best be 
measured (c.f. Paauwe & Boselie, 2005; Darwish & Singh, 2013). Moreover, it has been 
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argued that it is an interrelated system of HR practices that enhances performance, with one 
practice encountered on its own not having the same result than when encountered in 
combination with others (Ichniowski & Shaw, 1999). Sets of practices may add value to a 
firm in a range of different ways, such as through promoting greater cost-cutting or 
unleashing new synergies (Barney, 1991). As a large body of institutional literature reminds 
us, the viability of specific practices is closely related to setting, including sector (Amable, 
2003).  
There is a broad body existent literature that explores the impact of different sets of HR 
practices on organisational performance, although individual studies have tended to focus on 
a limited range of practices and/or to concentrate on mature market settings (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996; Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Wright & Gardner, 2003; Paauwe, 2009; Guest, 1997, 
2011; Singh et al., 2012). In contrast, this study looks at a relatively broad range of practices, 
within a key sector in an emerging market setting. Webster & Wood (2005) argue that, within 
emerging markets, firms may rely on people management practices that are far removed from 
the conceptualisations of HRM encountered in the advanced societies. Hence, the deployment 
of ‘modern’ forms of HRM may have little or no effect on performance, given specific 
societal and economic realities.   
This article has three main objectives: firstly, to explore the direct impact of specific set of 
HRM practices on organisational performance within the financial services industry in 
Jordan; secondly, to shed new light on the relationship between subjective and objective 
measures of organisational performance; and thirdly, whilst the potential impacts of HRM 
practices on performance is still a hugely debatable issue between the contingency and 
universalistic researchers, the present article, based on its findings in a non-Western context, 
also aims to explore whether or not it is true that Western-derived models of best practice 
have little relevance on an emerging market. As is the case with many other countries in 
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Jordan, the financial sector occupies a prominent position within the services sector; this 
sector is the largest and most well-developed services sector in the country, and is witnessing 
a great deal of deregulation, which is notably attracting private investment from within the 
country and overseas. This sector had been largely insulated from the recent financial crisis 
because of its as yet limited exposure to overseas capital markets; it is also the largest area of 
the Jordanian economy, accountable for a greater percentage of total GDP than any other 
sector (Bahous, 2006; World Fact Book, 2009).   
In addition, this sector was also selected owing to its increasing prominence in many national 
settings, and because it is often seen as a pioneering innovations that impact on other firms 
across an economy (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al, 2008). More specifically, within many 
national contexts, financial sector players have sought to actively promote people-
management practices centring on a narrow conceptualisation of agency theory, which 
suggests that managers—and, by extension, employees—are rational actors that will depart 
from the agenda of maximising shareholder value, unless closely reigned in, with continued 
tenure and reward contingent on performance (Jensen, 2000). Hence, it could be argued that 
firms within the financial services sector are particularly likely to promote specific sets of HR 
practices (both externally, and seek to emulate them internally), and that these may directly 
impact performance (see Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al., 2008). Jordan is a relatively 
developed and stable (and secular) Middle Eastern country with a significant industrial and 
commercial base. If specific sets of HR practice derived in the West are unable to generate 
significant performance improvements in such a setting, arguably, this would cast doubt on 
the broader relevance of such practices across much of the developing world. Again, firms 
operating in the wider Middle East region could learn useful lessons from what works in the 
Jordanian context, and what does not. 
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This paper is structured as follows: firstly, we highlight key strands of the existing HR 
literature that seeks to link together specific sets of HR practices with performance; secondly, 
we compare and contrast subjective and objective ways of measuring organisational 
performance; thirdly, we introduce the context of the present study; fourthly, we describe our 
methods and fifthly, our results; and finally, we move on to our conclusions, discuss their 
broad relevance, and draw out the implications for practice. In short, what we aim to do is 
identify which HR practices correspond with superior organisational performance in an 
emerging market setting, and whether or not these correspond with any identifiable Western 
paradigm of people management.  
Theoretical Perspectives on HRM–performance Link   
During the course of many decades, the field of HRM has attracted much attention across 
various disciplines owing to its contribution to and impacts on the bottom-line issues within 
organisations. The debate centres on an integrated management approach of how the entire 
set of HRM practices may eventually contribute to the competitive advantage of the 
organisation (Arthur, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Delery & Doty, 1996; Singh et al., 2012; Darwish 
& Singh, 2012). Such a transition reflects the importance of human resources in terms of 
gaining competitive advantage and achieving organisational performance (Singh et al., 2012). 
However, thus far, empirical research evidence has only partially verified the impact of HRM 
practices on performance (Pfeffer, 1994, 1998; Guest, 2011). Several researchers (for example, 
Paauwe & Boselie, 2005; Wright et al., 2005; Paauwe, 2009; Guest, 2011) demonstrate several 
inconsistencies, commenting that the nature of the HRM–performance link is ambiguous, 
and this area of research in particular needs more empirical work, and from different 
contexts. 
HRM–performance: The Nature of the Link 
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Since the notion of the HRM–performance link has emerged, two research streams have been 
developed in mind of examining the relationship between specific sets of HRM practices and 
performance. The first stream is based on the direct relationship between individual HR 
practices and/or bundles or systems of practices and organisational performance (Schuler & 
Jackson, 1999; Chand & Katou, 2007). The second research stream is based on the indirect 
relationship between individual HR practices and/or bundles of practices and performance 
(Wright & Gardner, 2003). With regard to the first path, studies on the HRM–performance 
link suggest specific HR practices that can lead to competitive advantage and, as a result, will 
provide the basis of superior organisational performance (Pfeffer, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; 
Huselid, 1995; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Guest, 1997). These specific practices—geared 
toward helping firms achieve better results—have been assigned different terms by different 
researchers, such as ‘best practices’ (Pfeffer, 1994), ‘high performance work system 
(HPWS)’ (Huselid, 1995; Way, 2002), ‘high-involvement practices’ (Wood & De Menezes, 
2008), and ‘high commitment practices’ (Arthur, 1994). Any identified optimal combination 
of HR practices essentially encompasses an element of selectivity (Guest, 1997; Brewster et 
al., 2008). However, regardless of the progress achieved by researchers thus far in terms of 
measuring HR practices, there is no consensus amongst researchers on what optimal practices 
could be or the number of practices that could enhance organisational performance (Dyer & 
Reeves, 1995; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Wright & Gardner, 2003; Brewster et al., 2008; 
Guest, 2011).  
Within a second, alternative research stream, researchers have criticised the way in which 
HRM impacts on organisational performance, arguing that whether individual or in a bundle, 
HR practices do not directly affect firm performance (Katou & Budhwar, 2007). Further, HR 
practices could directly impact some meditating variables (for example, employee turnover, 
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productivity) which, in turn, affect firm performance; this is what can be termed as the ‘black 
box’ in HRM–performance research. However, as there is no established method available to 
researchers to determine which HR practices could (indirectly) impact on organisational 
performance, little attention has been paid to exploring this aspect of research any further 
(Wright & Gardner, 2003; Wright et al., 2003). Hence, the present study aims to directly 
investigate the impacts of specific set of HRM practices on organisational performance. 
The Concept of Organisational Performance 
OP is one of the most broadly and extensively used dependent variables in organisational 
studies today, and yet, at the same time, this construct remains one of the most imprecise and 
loosely defined (Rogers & Wright, 1998). For many years, researchers have been struggling 
to establish a clear and precise meaning for OP, which is not only limited to the field of HRM 
but which is also applicable to many other fields (ibid.). Although the positive links between 
different HR practices and OP have been explored, in actual practice, the measurement 
process is a complex task. As a result, it is not surprising that, despite several attempts to do 
so, a fool-proof method still remains elusive (see Guest, 1997; Rogers & Wright, 1998; 
Paauwe & Boselie, 2005). Scott (1977, p. 63), in his review of the measures of organisational 
effectiveness, concludes that, ‘after reviewing a good deal of the literature on organisational 
effectiveness and its determinants, I have reached the conclusion that this topic is one about 
which we know less and less’. Conceptually, OP has been defined as the comparison of the 
value produced by a company with the value owners expected to receive from the company 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Venkatraman & Ramanujam (1986, p. 803) indicate that a 
narrow definition of performance centres on the use of simple outcome-based financial 
indicators that are assumed to reflect the fulfilment of the economic goals of the firm. 
Performance can also be defined in terms of stakeholder well-being (Dyer & Reeves, 1995). 
Furthermore, the term may also be described in terms of financial indicators (profits, sales, 
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return on assets) or capital market outcomes (market share, Tobin’s q, stock price, and 
growth). Importantly, in the strategy literature, the focal point of attention on this construct 
has been almost completely on financial measures of performance (Rowe et al., 1995).  
In contrast, the majority of the studies cantered on the HRM–performance link use subjective 
financial measures when striving to assess OP
1
. It would be more appropriate and rewarding 
to use multi-dimensional measures for OP as these measures could include various objective 
variables to reduce the probability of common method variance (Wall & Wood, 2005), and to 
thereby avoid misleading normative and descriptive theory-building (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996). Wall & Wood (2005) argue that an important limitation in HRM–performance 
research is that both variables (HRM and performance) are measured using the same source. 
In actual fact, objective measures reflect the economic rationality, which emphases outcomes, 
such as productivity and other financial indicators. Subjective measures, in contrast, reflect 
the normative rationality, which notably emphasise more behavioural and societal aspects of 
OP.  
Hence, much of the HR literature favours the usage of subjective measures of organisational 
performance (Razouk, 2011). It is true that objective measures may introduce limitations of 
their own through the increased risk of measurement errors and the effects of national 
variations in accounting standards; however, it has been argued that such measures remain 
more robust than subjective ones given the extent to which managers may seek to overstate 
performance, inter alia, owing to a reluctance to draw attention to their own shortcomings 
(see, for example, Dess & Robinson, 1984; Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Powell, 1992; Fey et 
al., 2000; Bjorkman & Budhwar, 2007; Razouk, 2011). A body of existing research suggests 
that the results obtained by subjective and objective measures tend to be broadly comparable 
                                                             
1 Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Wright et al., 1999; Fey et al., 2000; Richard & Johnson, 2001; Chang & Huang, 2005; Green et 
al., 2006; Andersen, 2007; Chand & Katou, 2007; Bjorkman & Budhwar, 2007; Macky & Boxall, 2007; Beltran-Martin et 
al., 2008; Joseph & Dai, 2009; Katou & Budhwar, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Moideenkutty et al., 2011; Razouk, 2011. 
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(Dess & Robinson, 1984; Tzafrir, 2005). For instance, Dess & Robinson (1984) suggest that 
self-reported OP measures are acceptable and are as equally reliable as objective measures; 
they correlate the subjective measures of performance with self-reported objective measures 
(collected through surveys as opposed to from the actual financial statements of the 
companies). In one of the earliest studies, Powell (1992) highlights various positive 
connections between the subjective and objective measures of OP (sales growth and 
profitability) on a subset of 52 firms from his studied sample in the US. In summary, there is 
an extensive body of HR literature based on subjective measures of performance, whilst 
within the wider strategy literature, objective measures have tended to be favoured. In 
contrast to the very extensive bodies of literature in each camp, there is a far more limited 
range of studies comparing these two measures, with none (of which we are aware) 
conducted in an emerging market setting. Yet, given the possibility that locally dominant 
managerial ideologies may mould perceptions, it can be argued that it is vital to include such 
a comparison, especially in an emerging market setting where there is relatively little existing 
research.  
HRM–Performance: Does the Context Matter?  
As noted above, extant research on direct HRM–performance links suggest specific HR 
practices that can lead to competitive advantage and which can, as a result, enhance 
organisational performance (Pfeffer, 1994; MacDuffie, 1995; Huselid, 1995; Delaney & 
Huselid, 1996; Guest, 1997). On the one hand, any combination of HR practices essentially 
encompasses an element of selectivity (Guest, 1997; Brewster et al., 2008). Hence, there is 
little consensus amongst researchers on the nature and optimal configuration of practices that 
could enhance organisational performance (Dyer & Reeves, 1995; Becker & Gerhart, 1996; 
Wright & Gardner, 2003; Brewster et al., 2008; Guest, 2011). On the other hand, a common 
theme across much of the literature is that HR practices tend to form coherent bundles, 
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which, in objective terms, lie towards one or the other end of a ‘hard’/’soft’ spectrum (Guest, 
2011; Brewster et al., 2008). Although each brings with it particular benefits and costs, it has 
been argued that, within advanced societies, firms will tend to adopt people management 
strategies towards one or other of these poles (Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990; Dore, 2000; Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Guest, 2011). ‘Softer’ stakeholder-orientated notions of best practice 
suggest that optimal results will be engendered through careful recruitment coupled with 
relatively secure tenure and a strong emphasis on internal career development and investment 
in people, and fairness and transparency in incentives and rewards (Pfeffer, 1998; Huczynski 
& Buchanan, 2007). In contrast, ‘harder’, more shareholder-value-orientated approaches rest 
on the assumption that individuals need to be firmly orientated to the bottom line through 
linking rewards and career progress to performance, and, indeed, regular appraisals 
(Hollingworth, 2009).  
Contingency-orientated approaches hold that specific sets of practice will continue to work 
better in some social settings rather than others (Brewster, 2007; Storey, 2007). Such 
assumptions underpin the undeniably diverse theoretical literature on comparative capitalism 
(see Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Whitley 1999). The latter suggests that institutions 
play a vital role in mediating social relations both within and between firms, engendering and 
maintaining specific patterns of behaviour (ibid.). This will result in combinations of rules, 
relations and practices within particular settings being complementary; in other words, likely 
to generate superior results owing to specific institutional supports (Hall & Soskice 2001).  
A large component of the early literature on comparative capitalism was dichotomous, 
dividing the developed world into liberal (LMEs) and coordinated market economies 
(CMEs); the former the Anglo-Saxon economies, the latter north-western continental Europe 
and Japan (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Dore, 2000; Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990). Each archetype 
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was associated with relative competitive advantages, and linked to specific sets of HR and 
other firm-level practices (ibid.). The latter would, inter alia, reflect variations in relative 
shareholder and countervailing employee and other stakeholder power, employment 
legislation, and skills and training infrastructures. In practical terms, it is held that harder, 
more instrumental HR approaches are more closely aligned with the broader systemic order, 
and represent the dominant paradigm within LME settings, and likewise, softer ones in CME 
ones (Gooderham et al., 1999, 2006; Dore, 2000). 
Whilst the early literature on comparative capitalism assumes that most other economies drift 
to one or another of these two mature models on account of their known complementarities 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001), critics have argued that other types of national economy would be 
likely to retain their distinct characteristics (Hancke et al., 2007). In practical terms, this 
raises the question as to whether, in a developing world setting, the types of HR practices 
capable of generating superior results would be similar to the dominant paradigm of one of 
the two mature models, or would be likely to have distinct features. On the one hand, it could 
be argued that, particularly within an industry such as financial services, there are strong 
pressures on firms to adopt policies and practices historically associated with the LME 
model. On the other hand, existing literature on people management in the developing world 
suggests that HR practices will retain distinct features often associated with higher levels of 
communitarianism, and with authoritarian-paternalistic management approaches being 
mitigated by informal ties and flexibilities (Webster & Wood, 2005; Jackson et al., 2008). 
This would suggest that the sets of HR practices encountered within the Jordanian financial 
services industry that generate optimal organisational performance will not necessarily 
correspond to recognisable bundles of practices (whether instrumentalist/hard or 
cooperative/soft) that are seen as generating superior results for Western firms operating in 
specific mature markets (see Webster & Wood, 2005). There is very limited research on 
Human Resource Management  
 
11 
HRM in Jordan, although a strand of existing work highlights the importance of local values 
and conventions (centring on strong notions of clan and community) in underpinning HR 
practice (Aladwan et al., 2011), as well as structural economic realities, namely high 
unemployment (Altarawmneh & Al-Kilani, 2010). Al-Hasan & James (2003) state that the 
Jordanian institutional and cultural setting appears to exert a relatively weak pull on MNC 
subsidiary practices, perhaps indicating a relatively high degree of fluidity; this may also 
reflect the extent to which strong informal networks may not necessarily provide a coherent 
substitute for more formal societal institutions in providing a stable foundation for particular 
organisational practices as a basis for growth (c.f. Hancke et al., 2007). 
Recent work has highlighted the extent to which institutions and associated wider societal 
relations may impact on the viability of specific sets of work and employment practices—not 
only on national lines, but also on sectoral ones (Lane & Wood, 2009). In this regard, a 
commonly drawn distinction is between manufacturing and services-sector work, and, more 
recently, in the latter, the specific characteristics of the financial services industry, which, as 
noted above, has been often seen as a pioneer of innovation (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al., 
2008). There is a very diverse body of literature that suggests that, whether for desirable 
(Jensen, 2000) or undesirable (Streeck, 2009) reasons, practices associated with the LME 
model will inevitably overwhelm all others, and that such innovations will flow from the 
financial services sector (Erturk et al., 2008).  
In summary, comparative institutional approaches suggest that, within specific contexts, a 
particular dominant mode of HR practices will be supported by systemic features and 
complementarities, and hence confer firms with competitive advantages (Hall & Soskice, 
2001). LMEs are associated with hard instrumental practices, and CMEs with softer, 
cooperative ones (Gooderham et al., 1999; Dore, 2000). On the one hand, it could be argued 
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that, when removed from its respective institutional supports, each paradigm would be 
unlikely to work as well (see Dore, 2000; Hall & Soskice, 2001). In short, in an emerging 
market setting, it is unlikely that either Western style hard or soft HRM will generate the 
same superior results as within mature contexts; rather, strongly performing firms will be 
likely to be deploying distinct HR models, probably with more pronounced paternalist and/or 
communitarian features (Webster & Wood, 2005). On the other hand, it could be argued that, 
particularly within innovative sectors, such as financial services, leading firms are likely to be 
pioneering harder practices associated with the LME model (see Dore, 2000; Erturk et al., 
2008). The potential for pioneering innovation may be rather pronounced in developing 
world settings where there is greater contextual fluidity (see Suresgchandar et al., 2002).    
The Research Context 
Jordan occupies a strategic location within the Middle East. In recent years, Jordan has 
opened up its markets to world trade and investment, and is fast becoming a credible player 
in global commerce. Jordan’s stock exchange has become one of the fastest growing open 
avenues for foreign investors. This growing international integration is exposing the country 
to both regional and international competition and risks (Al-Shammari & Hussein, 2008), 
which has subsequently coaxed companies into becoming increasingly competitive; however, 
given its limited natural resources, the onus is falling on the services sector, which 
contributes over 75% to the country’s national income. Importantly, the financial sector is the 
largest and best developed services sector in the country, and is witnessing a great deal of 
deregulation, which is attracting private investment from within the country and overseas; 
this sector had been largely insulated from the recent financial crisis because of its somewhat 
limited exposure to overseas capital markets (Bahous, 2006; World Fact Book, 2009; Singh 
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, this is changing fast, as became evident during the course of the 
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research for this paper, when the authors spoke to a large number of HR directors in charge 
of financial issues.  
Existing research on HRM in Jordan has highlighted the extent to which the inhospitable 
external labour market means that employees are likely to seek to hold on to existing jobs, 
even if terms and conditions of service are sub-optimal. This could eliminate excessive churn, 
and may mean that workers are more likely to tolerate sub-optimal HR practices but at the 
cost that workers are primarily negatively committed to the firm, with implications for 
productivity and performance (Altarawneh & Al-Kilani, 2010).  
Central Propositions 
In view of the above, the study has two broad central propositions. The first is that the sets of 
HR practices associated with optimal organisational performance (whether according to 
objective or subjective measures) in the Jordanian setting will not necessarily correspond 
with either the hard/instrumentalist or soft/cooperative Western models. Rather, the most 
effective sets of practices will be in line with national and sectoral complementarities, and 
specific historical and cultural traditions. As an alternative to this, it could be argued that 
practices encountered will broadly correspond with one or another of these models. Given 
that the shareholder value paradigm is likely to be particularly advanced within the financial 
services industry (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al., 2008), and the industry’s role in 
disseminating practices associated with the liberal market/shareholder dominant model, it is 
possible that the most effective practices encountered will be of the more instrumentalist 
variety. 
The second is that subjective measures of performance are likely to correspond broadly with 
more objective ones (c.f. Dess & Robinson, 1984; Tzafrir, 2005). In other words, both 
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represent equally valid ways of measuring organisational performance, and the sets of HR 
practices associated with each are likely to be interchangeable.   
Methodology  
Data and Sample 
The target population of this study is the financial sector of Jordan. A count of all the firms 
operating in the financial sector revealed a population of 104 firms in banking, insurance, real 
estate, brokerage and other financial services. These firms are all listed on Amman Stock 
Exchange (ASE). The unit of analysis in the present work is the organisation, with the 
targeted respondents including HR directors in the targeted companies, following almost all 
the work that has been conducted in the HRM–performance link. It was decided that all the 
firms in the population be approached for the purpose of data collection. We required two 
types of data for the study: the first set comprising primary data relating to the HRM 
operations of these firms; the second relating to their financial operations. A detailed 
questionnaire was drafted to gather the primary data. All 104 firms were contacted in person, 
of which 99 agreed to participate in the survey. Questionnaires were delivered by hand and 
collected in person. Cross-checks revealed data to be consistent and reliable. The matching 
financial data from profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets of the 99 firms were 
collected from the financial statements from ASE. Fortunately, government policies and 
regulations require all the listed companies to report the financial data in a consistent manner, 
which makes the inter-firm comparisons meaningful and unbiased. 
Methods  
In order to test the prepositions stated, the following approaches were adopted. First, 
exploratory factor analysis was conducted for all HRM practices with the aim of summarising  
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and grouping together data that was correlated. Additionally, in order to test the validity of 
the variables under consideration, confirmatory factor analysis was carried out. The 
descriptive analysis of data (Table 2 and Table 3) includes mean, standard deviation, 
skewness and kurtosis, and zero-order correlations. Hierarchical regression analysis is 
adopted for modelling the data. Prior to conducting the regression analysis, data was screened 
and tested for multivariate assumptions. Outliers test was conducted; the results revealed no 
extreme cases. Furthermore, the results of normality test revealed that the skewness and 
kurtosis values lie within the acceptable ranges, except for firm size and firm age, which were 
then transformed into logs. The relationships between variables were homoscedastic as they 
all met the normality assumption (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Tests also revealed the 
absence of multicollinearity between the variables. 
Construction of HR Practices  
Scales were built in order to measure HR practices and perceived financial performance for 
the first half of the study. Any mixture of HR practices essentially encompasses an element 
of selectivity (Guest, 1997; Brewster et al., 2008). The measures of HR practices were 
developed based on existing HRM literature. Our focus on HR practices has been developed 
based on the works of Delery & Doty (1996), Casson et al., (1996, 1997, 1998) and Pfeffer 
(1998), with the former having identified a set of HR practices of strategic import. In turn, 
their work is based on the theoretical and empirical work of Miles & Snow (1984), Osterman 
(1987), Kerr & Slocum (1987), and Sonnenfeld & Peiperl (1988). Hence, in this study, the 
HR practices scale covers five key areas of HRM: recruitment and selection; training; internal 
career opportunities; performance appraisals; and incentives and rewards. Recruitment and 
selection included questions on formal and informal qualifications and personal 
characteristics that companies considered in appointing an employee to a middle-grade 
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general management job. The training question related to the most applicable methods (of 
training). Internal career opportunities referred to as the main criteria of individual or group 
performance used in assessing cases for promotion. All questions were measured on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 ‘not applicable’ to 5 ‘always applicable’. Performance appraisal 
question inquired into how frequently appraisals were conducted and how fast feedback was 
dispensed. Finally, in the incentives and rewards section, three questions were posed, the first 
of which queried how the salary differentials were explained to employees (in other words, 
transparency in pay); the second asked questions on policies adopted to retain key staff (in 
other words, sensitivity to external labour market pressures); the third queried the benefits for 
an employee for working for the company (in other words, does the firm pay the minimum 
rate according to external labour market conditions or does it seek to provide superior pay to 
promote organisational commitment?). Such questions and their items were measured on a 
Likert scale ranging from 1 ‘not important’ to 5 ‘very important’. All items measuring HR 
practices are shown in Table 1.  
Exploratory Factor Analysis of HR Practices  
Factor analysis poses the question concerning how a large set of variables can be substituted 
by a smaller one that best reflects the large set (Wood et al., 2009). We performed principal 
component factor analysis with Varimax rotation for all the HR practices as shown in Table 
1. As proposed by Hair et al. (2010) in a sample of 100 respondents, factor loadings of .55 
and above are considered significant. As a result, some items were deleted as they lacked 
variations and caused interpretability problems at the conceptual level. The outcomes 
generated only one factor for each variable except incentives and rewards. Two factors were 
generated for this variable; they explained 41.65% of the total variance. The first factor is 
entirely associated with extrinsic incentives and rewards, such as pay increase and valuable 
fringe benefits. The second factor, in contrast, is entirely associated with intrinsic incentives 
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and rewards, such as a friendly and supportive work environment. This is consistent with the 
theoretical structure proposed by DeCenzo & Robbins (2005). The results confirm a robust 
and comprehensive structure of incentives and rewards. Therefore, the first factor was 
labelled as ‘extrinsic incentives and rewards’, whilst the second factor was labelled as 
‘intrinsic incentives and rewards’.  
Convergent and Discriminant Validity of HR Practices  
We conducted confirmatory factor analysis, which provided three main indicators to assess 
the convergent validity (Table 1) in the form of factor loadings, average variance extracted 
(AVE), and reliability of the construct (Hair et al., 2010). The results show that the factor 
loadings of each construct indicator are significant, ranging from 0.56 to 0.90, demonstrating 
a strong association between constructs and their factors. Further, the results indicate that 
AVE values were higher than the threshold value of 0.50, demonstrating adequate 
convergence of the constructs. Finally, the results of the Cronbach’s alpha test indicate that 
the scales satisfy the reliability criterion, with values ranging from .61 to .95. Two of our 
HRM scales had low reliabilities (training α .63; and performance appraisals α .61). Low 
reliability values of HRM scales have also encountered several researchers in HRM-
performance research (see, for example, Huselid, 1995) where he reported Cronbach’s alpha 
estimates of.66 and .67 for his HRM scales. This could be explained by multiple reasons. The 
first and most logical one is that these two scales had less measuring items comparing to the 
other scales which actually would cause low reliability estimates (see DeShon, 1998; Gerhart 
et al., 2000). In addition, we gathered our data from single-rater which could also have an 
impact on reliability estimates. Gerhart et al., (2000) found single-rater reliabilities to be 
frighteningly low. Such results were also supported by Wright et al., (2001). Wright et al., 
(2003) claim that the reliability of single-raters may be close to zero. Gerhart et al., (2000) 
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and Huselid and Becker, (1996) argued that coefficient alpha is an inadequate estimate of 
reliability as it ignores measurement error due to other sources such as raters. Reliability 
estimates would be lower if there is measurement error due to raters, meaning that the 
correction factors would become larger (for more details on this issue, see Gerhart, 2000). 
Moreover, low reliability estimates could also be explained due to our small sample size. 
Huselid and Becker (1996) argued that a larger sample size is preferable as small ones result 
in greater variability in observed values across samples. It can also be argued that the 
financial industry chosen in the present work relatively employs different types of operations 
(e,g., banks, insurance, real-state etc..) which makes for less consistency in HRM practices 
and policies, thus driving down reliability estimates (Gerhart et al., 2000). Finally, we would 
like also to highlight the issue of the level of analysis. This work is conducted at a firm-level 
of analysis which also could be a reason of having low reliability estimates. It was argued 
that reliability estimates can be lower at high level of analysis due to the difficulty in 
precisely measuring HR practices and the fact that these practices may be different across 
units within the firm (Gerhart et al., 2000). 
In addition to the abovementioned tests, Fornell & Larcker (1981) propose a method to test 
discriminant validity, claiming that the researcher can establish discriminant validity if the 
square root of the average variance extracted for a specific construct is greater than the 
absolute value of the standardised correlation of this specific construct with any other 
construct. As a result, the square roots of AVE values were compared with the constructs’ 
correlations, with the results showing that the squared roots of the AVE values were higher 
than any correlation of the HR practices constructs, indicating an acceptable level of 
discriminant validity (ibid.).  
TABLE-1 ABOUT HERE  
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Outcome Variables  
Perceived Financial Performance: Following almost all the work that has measured OP 
subjectively (see, for example, Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Wright et al., 1999; Fey et al., 
2000; Green et al., 2006; Joseph & Dai, 2009; Razouk, 2011), perceived financial 
performance was measured by three items in a Likert scale by a special section in the 
questionnaire, which directly asked respondents in the targeted companies to rate their main 
financial criteria comparing to their rivals in the industry in the past year (see Wright et al., 
2005; Darwish and Singh, 2013). Factor analysis indicated that these items remained strong 
measures reflecting this variable, namely profitability (after tax), holding market share, and 
sales revenue. As recorded in Table 1, the items had individual loadings ranging from 0.958 
to 0.978, thus emphasising extremely highly reliable items to measure this variable. 
Moreover, the test of internal consistency revealed that the overall measures of perceived 
financial performance highly satisfied the reliability criterion (α .95). Finally, we have also 
computed the variance inflation factor (VIF) in the regression model of HR practices and 
perceived financial performance. Lower levels of VIF are more desirable, as higher levels of 
such test are known to affect adversely the results associated with a multiple regression 
analysis. As a rule of thumb, a value greater than 10 is a good value at which to worry, and it 
may merit further investigation (see Kennedy, 1992; Field, 2009; Hair et al., 2010). 
However, other scholars (see, for example, Rogerson, 2001) recommended a maximum VIF 
value of 5 and even 4 (see Pan & Jackson, 2008). In our case, as recorded in Table 5, VIF 
values were all acceptable ranging from around 2 to 4.        
Actual Financial Performance: Return on assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are two 
essential outcome variables considered in the literature as indicators of firm financial 
performance (see, for example, Keats, 1988; Snell & Youndt, 1995; Delery & Doty, 1996; 
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Singh et al., 2012). ROA has been used as a measure of efficiency and resource exploitation 
in organisations (Keats, 1988; Snell & Youndt, 1995). ROE, in contrast, represents the 
eventual measure of the strength of any financial organisation (Earle & Mendelson, 1991). 
Retaining these variables for our study, data on these was obtained from ASE database. The 
study also follows the cross-sectional design wherein both predictors and outcome variables are 
measured on one occasion only. In this regard, HRM-performance cross-sectional research 
designs can be conducted using one of four main designs (see Wright et el., 2005) which are: 
Post-predictive designs; Retrospective design; Contemporaneous design; and Predictive 
design. Published in Personnel Psychology, the work of Wright and his colleagues, inter alia, 
summarizes the results from 68 empirical studies. Of these 50 (72%) used post-predictive 
methodology to investigate the HR-performance links (see, for example, Arthur, 1994; 
MacDuffie, 1995; Delaney and Huselid, 1996; Wright et al. 1999; Bae and Lawler, 2000; 
Way, 2002; Datta et al., 2005). We followed the post-predictive design in our work as such a 
design measures HRM practices and policies after the performance period, resulting in 
actually predicting past performance (Wright et el., 2005). The measures of ROA and ROE 
for this study were the year-end measures for 2007, and the survey was completed in 2008.  
We do not argue that the post-predictive design is the fool-proof method of analyzing the link 
between HRM and performance. In an extensive survey of literature that precedes and 
follows this particular quote, Wright et al. (2005a) essentially point out that there are 
limitations to whatever method the researcher employs to measure HR-performance link 
which are serious and should be prudently interpreted.   
Control Variables  
Firm size and age are commonly used control variables in the studies on HRM–performance 
link that can cause significant variations in the impact of HRM practices on OP (c.f. Collins 
& Clark, 2003). In this study, firm size and firm age are duly employed as control variables, 
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measured respectively in natural logs (see also Kimberly, 1976) by the number of employees 
in each company and the number of years the company has been in operation.  
Results  
Descriptive Results 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis of all variables. As 
stated earlier, the results of the normality test reveal that the variables’ skewness and kurtosis 
values lie within the acceptable limit of ranges, except for firm size and firm age, which were 
then transformed into logs. Table 3 presents the results of zero-order correlations of all 
predictors under consideration. It is instructive to note at the very outset that the relationship 
between HR practices is significant. A certain amount of correlation between the independent 
variables is expected; in fact, this is considered a good sign. Although some variables are 
highly correlated, the results show that no multicollinearity is evident (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2007). This would suggest that, whilst different sets of HR practices may be complementary 
(McDuffie 1995; Ichniowski & Shaw, 1999; Hall & Soskice 2001), it is possible that the 
optimal configuration may not only be contingent upon national context, but also due to the 
sector and specific characteristics of the firm. Performance appraisal was negatively 
correlated with all other scales. This may reflect institutional or cultural barriers to general 
acceptance of performance appraisal in Middle East settings (see Idris, 2007). 
TABLE-2 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
HRM and Objective Measures of Organisational Performance 
In this hypothesis, the direct relationship between HR practices and financial performance, as 
represented by ROA and ROE, is tested. We conducted hierarchical multiple regression as it 
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is the most widely employed regression technique in HRM–performance research (Bae & 
Lawler, 2000). The results are reported in Table 4, where control variables are entered in the 
first step and HR practices in the second step. The value of the R
2
 for ROA model is 
significant (R
2 
= .43, F = 8.42, p < .001). In contrast, R
2 
for ROE also shows a significant 
level of explanation of the outcome (R
2 
=.25, F = 3.83, p < .05) but not as much as the 
amount explained in the case of ROA.  
After controlling for firm size and firm age, the results show that HR practices explain a 
significant incremental level of variance beyond the controls explained in ROA (ΔR2 = .38, F 
for ΔR2 10.06, p < .001) and in ROE (ΔR2 = .25, F for ΔR2 = 4.94, p < .001). Hence, we can 
conclude that the regression model results in a significantly better predication of ROA than 
ROE, as can be seen from the value of F statistics for ΔR2, which is much higher in the case 
of ROA. Nonetheless, these results only provide weak support in terms of the number of 
specified relationships with objective financial performance. Of the six HR practices, training 
is the only practice positively related to ROA (b = .52, p < .01), and is marginally positively 
related to ROE (b = .34, p < .10). Regarding the rest of the HR practices, the results revealed 
no significant positive effects on financial performance. Accordingly, the question is posed: 
why does training have such a strong effect? As Brewster et al. (2012) note, training is an 
ambiguous measure in that firms may devote more attention to it either owing to a long-term 
commitment to employees and a high level of mutual interdependence, or otherwise owing to 
the need for basic induction to compensate for high levels of staff turnover. In short, a 
devotion to training may not necessarily be an indicator of either soft or instrumental HRM, 
but a prerequisite for organisational effectiveness should the firm follow either route. In other 
words, it is a broad policy prescription that may have relevance for very different reasons. 
We next assessed the practical significance of the impact of training as the only HR practice 
affecting financial performance by calculating the consequence of a one-standard-deviation 
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increase in training on the numerator of each dependent variable. Results indicated that one 
SD higher than the average on training is estimated to be 2.93 higher on ROA. As for ROE, 
in contrast, firms’ one SD higher than the average on training is estimated to be 3.12 higher 
on ROE. Accordingly, considering that these models control for firm size and firm age, the 
impact of training on financial performance is practically as well as statistically significant.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
HRM and Subjective Measures of Organisational Performance 
This hypothesis is a replication of the first hypothesis with only one difference, which is 
using the subjective or perceived financial performance instead of the actual one. The results 
of the hierarchical multiple regressions are shown in Table 5. In the first step, the control 
variables were entered, namely firm size and firm age, with all HR practices subsequently 
entered in the second step so as to examine their effects on perceived financial performance.  
The value of R
2
 is highly significant (R
2 
=.75, F = 43.29, p < .001). With firm size and firm 
age controlled, the results show that HR practices explain a strong significant incremental 
level of variance in R
2
 beyond what the controls explain in perceived financial performance 
(ΔR2 = .72, F for ΔR2 43.85, p < .001). Looking at the individual contributions for each 
practice, once again, training significantly affects perceived financial performance (b = .30, p 
< .01). However, in addition, internal career opportunities (b = .20, p < .05), as well as 
extrinsic incentives and rewards (b = .33, p < .01), have significant impacts on perceived 
financial performance. The latter (and to an extent the former)—in other words, material 
rewards accruing to rational actors—is perhaps not a surprising result given the dominant 
agency view within the financial services industry (see Froud et al. 2006; Erturk et al., 2008). 
With regard to the rest of the HR practices, the results revealed no significant effects of 
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recruitment and selection, performance appraisal system, and intrinsic incentives and rewards 
on perceived financial performance. It can be seen clearly from the results of the regression 
analysis that HR practices in the targeted companies can completely and better impact 
perceived financial performance than the actual financial performance as measured by ROA 
and ROE. We discuss these results further in the discussion section. 
TABLE 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE 
Relationship between Objective and Subjective Performance Measures  
A zero-order correlation between subjective and objective financial performance measures 
was conducted, as recorded in Table 6. The results are completely at odds with what has been 
argued in the literature (c.f. Dess & Robinson, 1984; Tzafrir 2005). Understandably and 
expectably, ROA and ROE—which represent the measures of the actual financial 
performance—are significantly correlated. However, what cannot be expected is the 
relationship between the perceived and actual measures of financial performance. As can be 
noted from Table 6, perceived financial performance is negatively and significantly 
correlated with objective financial performance.   
Discussion and Conclusions  
With regard to our first proposition, of all the HR practices, training was found to be 
statistically significant in having a strong impact on actual financial performance; in 
particular on ROA, and a weak effect on ROE. Such results completely contradict other 
studies that have employed actual measures of financial performance (see, for example, 
Delery & Doty, 1996) where researchers have not found any positive associations between 
training and actual measures of ROA and ROE. In the past, very few studies have employed 
objective financial indicators, such as ROA and ROE, which makes comparisons difficult. 
However, broadly speaking—and regardless of the type of performance measures used—the 
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results of this are found to be consistent with the findings of a wide range of researchers (see, 
for example, Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Wright et al., 2003; Chand & Katou, 2007; 
Moideenkutty et al., 2011) on the impact of training, although these studies have established 
that a range of other HR practices also had a positive impact. Why is training of such 
universal relevance? As noted above, firms may engage in training in response to 
diametrically opposed strategies; it may be both a sign of a long-term commitment to people 
and a response to high staff turnover, necessitating a strong emphasis on induction and 
orientation (Brewster et al., 2012). Hence, a commitment to training does not, in itself, 
represent a strong indicator of a specific underlying HR strategy, but may be one that is 
closely linked to performance. Regardless, however, whatever the underlying rationale, a 
failure to invest in training of some sort or another is likely to undermine results.  
However, our results do not tally with these studies in terms of the impacts of the other HR 
practices on performance. A probable reason for such differences in terms of not finding or 
lacking other significant effects for the rest of HR practices on performance is that most 
previous studies have linked HR practices with subjective indicators rather than objective 
indicators. Such a conclusion is evidenced in the work, with completely different results seen, 
even when using the same HR practices and same performance measures. More specifically, 
internal career opportunities and extrinsic incentives and rewards have significant impacts on 
perceived financial performance, but not on actual performance. Such findings are in line 
with the majority of previous works, where researchers have found positive associations 
between HR practices and perceptual measures of OP (for example, Delaney & Huselid, 
1996; Wright, 2003; Chand & Katou, 2007; Joseph & Dai, 2009; Razouki, 2011; 
Moideenkutty et al., 2011). Why is this the case? Firstly, as noted above, it could reflect the 
widespread currency of the view that material incentives to staff are likely to optimise 
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organisational performance—a viewpoint particularly prevalent in the financial services 
industry (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al., 2008). Secondly, it could reflect the extent to 
which Western-derived models of best practice may have little relevance in an emerging 
market setting (c.f. Webster & Wood, 2005).  
Comparing both sets of results, it can be seen that HR practices have a much stronger impact 
on perceived financial performance than the actual financial performance measured by ROA 
and ROE. With firm size and firm age controlled, the results show that HR practices explain 
a strong significant incremental level of variance in R
2
 beyond what the controls explain in 
perceived financial performance (ΔR2 = .72, F for ΔR2 43.85, p < .001), whilst the same 
practices explain much less significant incremental level of variance beyond what the 
controls explain in ROA (ΔR2 = .38, F for ΔR2 10.06, p < .001) and in ROE (ΔR2 = .25, F for 
ΔR2 = 4.94, p < .001). Additionally, comparing the individual contributions of HR practices, 
training was as the only HR practice seen to significantly impact the actual financial 
performance, although three HR practices (training, internal career opportunities, and 
extrinsic incentives and rewards) are significantly related to perceived financial performance.  
Hence, the second proposition was disproved: findings are inconsistent with previous works 
that established a positive correlation between actual and perceived financial performance 
(Dess & Robinson, 1984; Powell, 1992; Tzafrir, 2005). In addition, our results contradict 
with what has been argued in the literature that self-reported measures of OP are good 
enough, can reflect actual performance measures, and enable managers to factor in 
companies’ objectives when evaluating their performance (for example, Dess & Robinson, 
1984; Geringer & Hebert, 1991; Delaney & Huselid, 1996; Fey et al., 2000; Richard & 
Johnson, 2001; Chang & Huang, 2005; Green et al., 2006; Andersen et al., 2007; Chand & 
Katou, 2007; Joseph & Dai, 2009; Katou & Budhwar, 2010; Lee et al., 2010; Moideenkutty 
et al., 2011; Razouk, 2011). In contrast, such a finding would support that which has been 
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argued by some researchers (for example, Lumpkin & Dess, 1996; Wall & Wood, 2005), 
which is that it would be more appropriate and rewarding to use multi-dimensional measures 
for performance as these measures could include various objective variables to reduce the 
probability of common method variance, and to thereby avoid misleading normative and 
descriptive theory-building. 
This finding could also reflect the extent to which the dominant prevailing frame of reference 
within the industry has perhaps served to cloud the judgment of managers. What the results 
suggest is that managers believe that, employees, as rational profit-maximising individuals, 
are likely to be primarily motivated by extrinsic rewards (pay and career progression), and 
that if the firm adopts such measures, the organisation will inevitably perform better. Again, 
if managers feel they are being judged largely or exclusively on the financial performance of 
the organisation, they may be reluctant to concede the firm is doing less than optimally as this 
will amount to an admission of their shortcomings. It is precisely within such firms that a 
stronger commitment to instrumentalist ways of managing people is likely to be encountered.  
This leads to the question concerning why a greater range of HR practices does not impact 
real organisational performance, in contrast to the wishful thinking of managers. The fact that 
the main predictor, i.e. training, is an ambiguous measure with a strong commitment to 
training flowing out of radically different underlying HR strategies would suggest that the 
efficacy of HR practices is contingent on not only national circumstances but also the specific 
characteristics of the firm, and indeed its relationship with governments, other firms, and 
associations (c.f. Lane & Wood, 2009). It is possible that, as suggested by the literature on 
comparative capitalism, emerging market institutions are not nearly as closely coupled as 
their mature market counterparts, making the emergence of coherent, complementary sets of 
practices less likely (Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancke et al., 2007). We found little evidence to 
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suggest that either coherent hard or soft HR policies are capable of generating superior results 
in objective terms. Whilst this may be hardly surprising, what was more so as that there was a 
recognisable alternative HR paradigm more closely aligned to local institutional realities, 
which appeared capable of generating superior results in the Jordanian setting. This may 
reflect the extent to which institutions in emerging markets are less closely aligned and 
coherent, making for fewer complementarities (c.f. Hancke et al., 2007). Does this mean that 
the bulk of HR practices has little or no effect on organisational performance? The study did 
not encounter diffuse diversity; rather, it would suggest that very different approaches may be 
equally valid in developing market settings where institutional supports are weaker and more 
fluid, as Al-Hasan & James (2003) suggest may be the case in the Jordanian context. At the 
same time, the choice of specific HR practices may have consequences on a wide range of 
other areas than returns to shareholders in the short-term, such as the well-being of 
employees and other stakeholders, which, in turn, may impact the long-term viability of the 
firm (Aoki, 2010). The latter may have little relevance for those primarily concerned with 
short-term results, but are relevant for longer term investors and, indeed, the community at 
large (Dore, 2000). 
Implications for Practice 
This study is one conducted in an emerging market in the Middle East. At the same time, the 
findings have relevance for practice both within the context in which the research was 
conducted, and more broadly. Whatever their applicability within mature markets, it appears 
that the usage of specific sets of best practices (be they instrumental or softer) have little 
impact on organisational performance in Jordan; nor does an optimal configuration of HR 
practices readily emerge within the Jordanian financial services industry. This would suggest 
that what works for individual firms may not work for many seemingly comparable 
organisations. Whilst these may represent an example of extreme contingency, it is worth 
Human Resource Management  
 
29 
noting that some existing research on the developing world suggests that firms in such 
contexts often rely on undocumented practices that do not readily coincide with modern 
approaches to HRM (Webster & Wood, 2005). Such practices may include the extensive 
usage of informal family and clan networks in recruitment, and the extent to which formal 
pay systems may be supplemented by informally extended assistance (ibid; c.f. Aladwan et 
al., 2011). Local and expatriate managers who ignore such realities may undermine the 
existing basis of organisational effectiveness without necessarily replacing it with a more 
viable one. What the existing research on HRM in Jordan alerts us to is that national 
institutional features realities do not appear to exert a particular strong homogenising impact 
on firm practice (Al-Hasan & James, 2003). This would suggest that such informal ties and 
conventions may induce diversity, rather than a dominant local modus operandi. 
Secondly, the study highlights the extent to which managers may have their judgments 
swayed by dominant dogmas. Within the financial services industry, the assumption that 
individuals are rational profit-maximising actors, solely motivated by material rewards, has 
gained particular currency (Froud et al., 2006; Erturk et al., 2008). Even if this is belied by 
empirical evidence, many respondents appear to have been so swayed by this view so as to 
hold on to the belief that the extensive usage of material incentives is bound to translate into 
superior results—even the reality is rather different. This would serve to highlight the extent 
to which specific HR strategies may be imposed according to senior managerial ideologies, 
irrespective of whether they work or not, creating considerable challenges for HR 
professionals.   
Limitations  
Despite the contributions of this article, there are nevertheless some limitations to be 
acknowledged. The study is conducted with regard to one sector (financial) only, and 
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although the whole population of firms was very nearly covered, the sample size could have 
been bigger. Therefore, we suggest that future researchers conduct such a study targeting a 
larger and more diverse sample. Moreover, data on HRM practices were collected by single 
respondents from the targeted companies. Time and funds permitting, future researchers can 
endeavour to use multiple respondents in their work. In addition, the study utilises a cross-
sectional design. Although we have argued that HRM practices should lead to stronger 
organisational performance in some cases, our cross-sectional design does not allow us to 
rule out the possibility of reverse causation (Wright et al., 2005). A longitudinal design 
would help to strengthen the reverse causation possibility and overcome time-lag effects of 
HRM on performance (Andersen et al., 2007). Longitudinal designs on HRM–performance 
studies are required in order to conclusively and decisively replicate such findings 
represented here, although such data are costly to obtain and are as yet unavailable in many 
cases (Huselid, 1995). 
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Table 1: Convergent validity (standardized factor loadings, average variance extracted, and reliability results) 
Items 
Recruitment 
&  
selection 
Training 
Internal 
career 
opportunity 
Performance 
appraisals 
Extrinsic 
incentives 
& 
rewards 
Intrinsic 
incentives 
& 
rewards 
Perceived 
financial 
performance 
Qualifications (command of languages) .853       
Personal characteristics (potential to grow with 
the job) 
 
.841 
      
Personal characteristics (commitment to the 
company ) 
 
.834 
      
Personal characteristics (self-motivation) .826       
Qualifications (professional qualification other 
than schools and universities) 
 
.796 
      
Qualifications (previous experience of a 
similar job) 
 
.789 
      
Qualifications (wide range of work experience) .699       
Qualifications (schools and universities) .693       
Personal characteristics (independent 
judgment) 
 
.689 
      
Personal characteristics (total devotion to task) .684       
Qualifications (work experience in other 
countries) 
 
.629 
      
Personal characteristics (willingness to travel) .602       
Training provided by a third party organization 
but tailored to company needs 
  
.838 
     
Induction into a group by socialization and 
imitation 
  
.759 
     
Formal instructions within the company  .559      
Quality of output   .854     
Value of output-independent of profit margin   .831     
Keeping within budget   .776     
Effort – independent of final results   .757     
Overall professionalism   .718     
How frequently appraisals are conducted    .828    
After the appraisal, how fast is the feedback 
given to employees 
    
.826 
   
Rewards (basic pay above the industry level)     0.880   
Rewards (valuable fringe benefits)     0.831   
Social and psychological benefits (job 
Security) 
    
0.770 
  
Salary differentials (management must be free 
to reward people in whatever way best serves 
the company’s interests) 
    
0.662 
  
Salary differentials (they are fair in the context 
of the company’s system of values) 
    
0.646 
  
38 
Salary differentials (they reflect the firm’s own 
evaluation of the jobs people perform) 
    
0.609 
  
Rewards (better career prospects than other 
firms in the same industry) 
    
0.580 
  
Social and psychological benefits (the prestige 
of working for one of the top firms in the 
industry) 
    
0.566 
  
Rewards (the opportunity to earn large bonuses 
through greater efforts) 
     
0.756 
 
Social and psychological benefits (friendly and 
supportive colleagues) 
     
0.741 
 
Rewards (annual salary increments above the 
inflation rate) 
     
0.712 
 
Social and psychological benefits (interesting 
and challenging work) 
     
0.652 
 
Profitability (after tax)       .978 
Sales revenue       .975 
Holding market share       .958 
Average Variance Execrated (AVE) .56 .53 .63 .68 .50 .52 .79 
Reliability (cronbach’s alpha) .93 .63 .83 .61 .77 .75 .95 
Note: All deleted items (not reported in this table) had factor loadings below .55, which is considered the minimum significance level in 
comparison with our sample size (Hair et al., 2010)
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Table 2: Basic statistics on variables 
             Variables 
  
Mean 
Std. Deviation 
Variance 
 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Recruitment and Selection 41.14 .954 9.497 90.184 -.100 .243 -.899 .481 
Training 13.25 .334 3.32 11.02 -.045 .243 -1.41 .481 
Internal Career 
opportunities 23.19 .445 4.43 19.62 -.271 .243 -.75 .481 
Performance appraisals 6.18 .138 1.37 1.88 .075 .243 -.21 .481 
Extrinsic Incentives and 
Rewards 27.95 .56 5.58 31.16 -1.00 .243 -1.06 .481 
Intrinsic Incentives and 
Rewards 14.03 .29 2.93 8.60 -.09 .243 .035 .481 
ROA 4.023 .572 5.694 32.423 -.042 .243 .093 ..481 
ROE 7.549 .933 9.291 86.337 -.408 .243 .907 .481 
Perceived Financial 
Performance   17.92 .875 8.70 75.76 .087 .243 -1.23 .481 
Firm Size 3.39 .195 1.94 3.78 097 .243 -.383 .481 
Firm Age 2.55 .095 .952 .907 -.355 .243 -1.089 .481 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Zero-order correlations of variables 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Recruitment and Selection 1        
2. Training .73** 1       
3.Internal Career Opportunity .67** .68** 1      
4.Performance Appraisals -.54** -.52** -.53** 1     
5. Extrinsic Incentives and Rewards .63** .65** .68** -.60** 1    
6. Intrinsic Incentives and Reward .32** .28** .32** -.15 .02 1   
7. Log Firm Size .34** .20* .27** -.16 .30** .09 1  
8. Log Firm Age .27** .15 .17 -.32** .27** -.09 .67** 1 
    ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4: Hierarchical regression analysis for ROA and ROE 
Variables Step 1  Step 2  
 
Step1 Step 2  
ROA ROA ROE ROE 
 
 
Controls:  
Log. Firms Size 
Log. Firm Age 
Β Sig. Β Sig. Β Sig. Β Sig. 
 
 
-.215 
.005 
 
 
.112 
.970 
 
 
-.341 
-.087 
 
 
.003** 
.457 
 
 
.038 
.59 
 
 
.782 
.666 
 
 
-.050 
-.023 
 
 
.701 
.861 
         
HR Practices  
Recruitment and Selection 
Training 
Internal Career Opportunities 
Performance Appraisals 
Extrinsic Incentives and Rewards 
Intrinsic Incentives and Rewards 
   
-.164 
.515 
-.040 
-.162 
.190 
.019 
 
.225 
.001** 
.795 
.221 
.227 
.849 
   
-.197 
.336 
.045 
-.159 
.189 
-.015 
 
.202 
.050† 
.797 
.292 
.294 
.898 
R2  
ΔR2 
F for ΔR2 
.05  (.03) 
.05 
.43 (.38)                                                 
.38 
10.06*** 
.008 (-.013) 
.008 
.254 (.19) 
.25 
4.94*** 
Durbin-Watson
2
 2.18 2.11 
Notes:    N = 99. Standardized regression coefficients are shown.  Adjusted R2 is in parentheses  † p < .10,  *p < .05, **p < 
.01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
  
 
Table 5: Hierarchical regression analysis for perceived financial performance 
Variables               Step 1                    Step 2 
Perceived Financial Performance  Perceived Financial Performance 
 
Controls:  
    Log. Firms Size 
    Log. Firm Age 
Β Sig. Β                Sig.        VIF 
 
-.125 
-.066 
 
.358 
.627 
 
.139 
-.012 
 
.066† 
              .875 
 
HR Practices 
    Recruitment and Selection 
    Training 
    Internal Career Opportunities 
    Performance Appraisals 
    Extrinsic Incentives and Rewards 
    Intrinsic Incentives and Rewards 
 
   
 
.134         
.301 
.204 
.026 
.326 
.059 
 
 
             .134         2.83 
             .003**     3.46      
             .047*       3.73  
             .764         2.72    
             .002**     3.85 
            .363         1.53 
R2  
ΔR2 
F for ΔR2 
.031  (.011) 
.031 
1.526 
.753 (.731) 
.72 
43.853*** 
 
Durbin-Watson  1.82 
Notes:    N = 99. Standardized regression coefficients are shown.  Adjusted R
2
 is in parentheses † p < .10, *p < 
.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
                                                             
2 The Durbin-Watson test is largely used in time-series data. However, the statistic of the test can be an important diagnostic 
indicator even when the researcher is not utilizing time-series data. A statistically significant Durbin-Watson test when the 
researcher is testing a model based on cross-sectional data can be an indication of specification error such as omitted 
variables or incorrect functional form (Crown, 1998). 
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      Table 6: Zero-order correlations of subjective and objective financial measures  
Variables ROA ROE 
Perceived Financial 
Performance 
ROA 1   
ROE .761** 1  
Perceived Financial Performance  -.588** -.463** 1 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
***** 
 
